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Abstract
Objectives To evaluate the implementation and adoption of the NHS
detailed care records service in “early adopter” hospitals in England.
Design Theoretically informed, longitudinal qualitative evaluation based
on case studies.
Setting 12 “early adopter” NHS acute hospitals and specialist care
settings studied over two and a half years.
Data sources Data were collected through in depth interviews,
observations, and relevant documents relating directly to case study
sites and to wider national developments that were perceived to impact
on the implementation strategy. Data were thematically analysed, initially
within and then across cases. The dataset consisted of 431
semistructured interviews with key stakeholders, including hospital staff,
developers, and governmental stakeholders; 590 hours of observations
of strategic meetings and use of the software in context; 334 sets of
notes from observations, researchers’ field notes, and notes from national
conferences; 809 NHS documents; and 58 regional and national
documents.
Results Implementation has proceeded more slowly, with a narrower
scope and substantially less clinical functionality than was originally
planned. The national strategy had considerable local consequences
(summarised under five key themes), and wider national developments
impacted heavily on implementation and adoption. More specifically,
delays related to unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of
systems; the time needed to build, configure, and customise the software;
the work needed to ensure that systems were supporting provision of
care; and the needs of end users for training and support. Other factors
hampering progress included the changing milieu of NHS policy and
priorities; repeatedly renegotiated national contracts; different stages of
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development of diverse NHS care records service systems; and a
complex communication process between different stakeholders, along
with contractual arrangements that largely excluded NHS providers.
There was early evidence that deploying systems resulted in important
learning within and between organisations and the development of
relevant competencies within NHS hospitals.
Conclusions Implementation of the NHSCare Records Service in “early
adopter” sites proved time consuming and challenging, with as yet limited
discernible benefits for clinicians and no clear advantages for patients.
Although our results might not be directly transferable to later adopting
sites because the functionalities we evaluated were new and untried in
the English context, they shed light on the processes involved in
implementing major new systems. The move to increased local decision
making that we advocated based on our interim analysis has been
pursued and welcomed by the NHS, but it is important that policymakers
do not lose sight of the overall goal of an integrated interoperable
solution.
Introduction
England’s National Programme for IT was, from its outset, an
ambitious effort aiming to introduce national electronic health
records across NHS care providers throughout the country (see
appendix 1 on bmj.com).1-6 It is distinguished by its scale,
unprecedented levels of investment, complexity of systems,
centrally driven delivery model, and extremely challenging
timelines.7-10 The English endeavour is one of the few sustained
attempts to implement electronic health records—described by
a recent Minister of Health as “the jewel in the crown of the
NPfIT”—on a truly national scale.11 A brief history of the
National Programme is given in appendix 2 on bmj.com.
Building on our formative work in five acute and mental health
hospitals,12we present our summative findings from longitudinal
qualitative work conducted over a longer period of time in a
broader range of “early adopter” sites. We examined the local
consequences of the centralised implementation and adoption
strategy in the light of broader national developments to inform
the ongoing implementation strategy. Findings from our related
quantitative work will be reported in due course.13 Our work
and the closely related evaluation of the summary care record
systems are, we believe, the first attempts to prospectively study
the implementation of electronic health record systems on a
substantial scale.14 15 This report is timely as the future direction
of NHS IT—and specifically the NHSCare Records Service—is
still highly uncertain. At the time of writing, the public accounts
committee has published its updated assessment and the National
Audit Office has published its third review of the National
Programme for IT concluding that “progress with the delivery
of care records systems continues to fall well below
expectations.”16 17Apublic consultation on future NHS IT policy
in England has taken place, with an announcement on the
ultimate outcome of the National Programme expected in late
2011.18
Methods
Ethics and governance
Our research was reviewed by an NHS ethics committee and
classified as a service evaluation.We obtained informed consent
from participating hospitals and individuals, while also
complying with local governance requirements. All data were
anonymised and care has been taken to ensure that the data
presented here are neither attributable to participating sites nor
to individuals to protect anonymity.
Design
We conducted a prospective longitudinal and real time
evaluation of the introduction of the NHS Care Records Service
in hospitals and specialist community care settings (henceforth
referred to as hospitals) over a 30 month period from September
2008 to February 2011.13 We collected a broad range of
qualitative data from “early adopter” hospitals committed to
taking one of the three core software systems—Lorenzo
Regional Care, Cerner Millennium, and RiO.12 We use the term
“early adopter” in a broad sense to refer to hospitals that were
among the first to receive these systems as part of the National
Programme. Our evaluation drew on sociotechnical principles.19
The nature of sociotechnical evaluations has been discussed at
length in our interim paper, but this in essence refers to the close
and in some instances virtually inseparable relation between
organisational/professional and technical considerations. Use
of this theoretical approach helped to minimise the risk that we
focused unduly (or indeed neglected) either the
organisational/professional or technical dimensions of
implementation efforts.
We conceptualised participating hospitals as individual case
study sites to reflect the importance of local contingencies, using
this detailed understanding of local considerations as a platform
from which to undertake a cross site synthesis and generate
insights that could be transferable to other hospitals.20-23 In doing
so, we developed each case study in a way that allowed the
specific character of the implementation and adoption of the
software in each site to be revealed. This involved the analysis
of data obtained from individual hospitals and writing of detailed
individual case study reports describing local characteristics
and developments over time. Data were collected and analysed
without a constraining overarching framework, which enabled
us to capture the diversity of experiences and the influence of
the local environment on implementation efforts. Case studies
were then considered in a cross case comparison to find common
and contrasting themes between hospitals but also alternative
and distinct experiences. Cross case comparisons were followed
by integration with additional data obtained that did not directly
relate to hospitals themselves but to the wider environment
(such as policy documents, interviews with system developers,
etc).
Sampling
Designated lead researchers were assigned to individual sites
and were responsible for recruitment of hospitals and individual
participants. We selected hospitals using purposive sampling
to identify diverse organisations (teaching versus non-teaching;
more autonomous versus less autonomous; and acute versus
mental health settings) across the three geographical
implementation areas (North Midlands and East, London, and
Southern England) and the three centrally procured NHS Care
Records Service applications (table⇓).24-26 This was achieved by
drawing up a list of hospitals planning to implement different
functionality during the course of our evaluation and using
maximum variability sampling to identify sites to approach.
Within each of the case studies, we purposefully recruited a
diverse range of interviewees, actively seeking the broadest
range of perspectives.27 28 As case studies varied in relation to
local arrangements and preferences, approaches to recruitment
of participants were flexible, being negotiated with key contacts
and gatekeepers at each hospital.
Individual informants were initially recruited through
recommendations of managers and, in some cases, also
approached directly during site visits, based on recommendations
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of previous interviewees. Our interviewees included junior and
senior hospital managers, implementation team members and
IT staff, junior and senior doctors and nurses, allied health
professionals, administrative staff, and, when appropriate and
possible, patients and carers.
We also purposively sampled key stakeholders outside the
immediate environment of implementation to understand the
wider contextual landscape as this was found to play a more
central role in influencing local implementation than we had
originally envisaged.29These informants were identified through
our existing contacts within NHS Connecting for Health,
approached at relevant national conferences, or approached
directly based on recommendations from case study sites. These
were individuals who had an active interest in the
implementation and adoption of relevant systems, including
civil servants, staff from NHS Connecting for Health, strategic
health authorities, local service providers, system developers,
and relevant independent sector representatives.
Settings
We initially collected data from 17 different locations, from
which we identified 12 sites that satisfied our inclusion criteria
for detailed case studies—that is, hospitals that had either begun
implementing NHS Care Records Service software or were
planning to do so during our evaluation period. These 12 sites
therefore represented the focus of our efforts.
Data collection and handling
We conducted semistructured interviews with a range of key
stakeholders and, in most cases, these were audio recorded and
transcribed. Some interviews were not recorded, in keeping with
participants’ wishes. Their concerns about being recorded
possibly reflected the politically and commercially sensitive
nature of the research environment (in such cases researchers
took notes).30-33 Topic guides were tailored to interviewees’ roles
and emerging issues but essentially these were designed to
explore participants’ attitudes, challenges encountered, and
proposed potential solutions to these. Sample topic guides can
be viewed in appendix 3 on bmj.com.
Interviews were complemented by researchers’ field notes
describing experiences during data collection and noting down
early findings, as well as observational and documentary data
from hospitals, national documents, meetings with governmental
stakeholders, and conferences. Observations were conducted in
each case study site. This included researchers shadowing user
related activities or strategic meetings, or both. Potentially
relevant local and national documents were identified through
various routes, including discussions with interviewees, contacts
at NHS Connecting for Health, and proactive searches for
relevant governmental, media, hospital, and academic reports.
These documents were selected on the basis of providing an
insight into contexts, planned changes relating to the
implementation, and early lessons learnt.
When possible and relevant, to trace changes over time, data
collection at each hospital took place in two phases (time 1 and
time 2) with a gap of six to nine months in between. In some
cases, however, division into two phases was not possible or
appropriate. Throughout the study, emerging qualitative findings
were fed back to individual participating hospitals, NHS
Connecting for Health, and our funders through formative
feedback sessions.12 The discussions that ensued informed
subsequent data collection and were taken into account in the
final analysis.
Data analysis
Lead researchers (AR, AT, DP, KC, SC, TC, VL, and ZM)
collected data in individual hospitals and also led on the thematic
analysis of individual case studies.20-23 Regular analysis
workshops with the wider team helped us to validate findings
from individual case studies and to integrate multiple case
studies to draw out transferable findings. Adopting a sequential
or iterative analysis enabled us to refine questions, develop and
challenge assumptions, and pursue emerging avenues of inquiry
in later data gathering.21 34 We continued data collection until
saturation was reached (that is, no new rich diverse data relevant
to the evaluation emerged for the duration we were in the field).
This was partly influenced by factors related to the setting, such
as the scale of the deployment at each site (for example, limited
to a ward or hospital-wide) and type of functionalities being
introduced (for example, software modules for ordering of
clinical tests or clinical notes).
In analysing data from case studies, we combined deductive
thematic coding informed by sociotechnical principles12 and
inductive coding that allowed themes to emerge from the
data.19 26 This process involved immersion in the data, which
was achieved by repeated reading of interview transcripts,
discussion among team members, development of provisional
analytic categories/themes informed by our theoretical lens and
the wider literature, and iterative refinement of these categories
using the constant comparative method (comparing our analysis
with new data as these emerged). Our overall understanding of
the implementation of systems was one that balanced the
delivery of the technology (specific software functionality,
computers, networks, databases, training manuals, etc)
undertaken by the local service providers and software suppliers
with the hospitals’ role of integrating this into their
operations—what we termed adoption. To understand these
adoption issues, analysis drew on notions of “working out” and
“changing.”19 This approach helped with investigating the
extended processes of change over time and the ways in which
users of new systems and the organisations in which they were
based worked out how to accommodate the technology into
their work practices and the processes through which they
delivered patients’ care.
Results
The table in appendix 4 on bmj.com provides a detailed profile
of our case study sites. Our complete dataset comprised 431
semistructured interviews, 590 hours of observations, 234 sets
of notes from observations, researcher field notes, and
conferences, 809 NHS documents, and 58 national and regional
documents.
The interviews were conducted with healthcare professionals
(41%); hospital managers and administrative staff (26%);
hospital based IT implementation leads (18%); staff from NHS
Connecting for Health (8%); local service provider staff (2%);
patients and carers (2%); and a range of other relevant
stakeholders (3%).
Our longitudinal approach allowed us to differentiate between
more isolated transitory challenges and those that were more
overarching or persistent, or both. We were therefore able, for
example, to understand how local deployments in sites were
influenced by wider contextual factors, the impact of which
intensified over the period of our evaluation (summarised in
box 1). We also developed a detailed understanding of the local
challenges of implementation of NHS Care Records Service
systems and the range of consequences that followed. Depending
on the system in question (described in more detail in box 2),
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2011;343:d6054 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6054 Page 3 of 14
RESEARCH
and often heavily influenced by organisational history and
developments over time, consequences were identified relating
to individual work practices and organisational functioning.
As each implementation was different—different organisations,
of different sizes in different geographical areas, and with
different legacy software systems, IT infrastructures, skill mixes,
employee relations, work processes, histories, visions for change
and technology deployed—some findings (unsurprisingly) varied
across sites (see appendix 4 on bmj.com). As a result, there were
distinct stories of local working out (see box 3 for these in
relation to different systems). These detailed stories will be
reported in more detail in due course, but in this paper we focus
on the more overarching themes identified across sites.
Some aspects of our findings confirmed and strengthened the
themes reported in our interim paper and are also in line with
previous findings from the literature.1 14 15 29 35-83 Rather than
reiterate these confirmatory themes here, we have focused on
several novel findings, particularly those of national and
international interest. We present these, illustrated by data that
have been selected on the basis of representativeness and
descriptive power.13 Further supporting data are available on
request from the corresponding author. Our findings are
organised along the two key themes (with other themes and
subthemes detailed in box 4): local consequences of the national
strategy and the national implementation landscape.
Local consequences of the national strategy
Implementing NHSCare Records Service systems on a national
scale was an extremely complex activity, with the potential to
impact on large numbers of clinical, managerial, and
administrative staff with different needs, expectations, and
experiences. During this process, staff had to learn and work
out the consequences of such systems day by day, and this
learning is likely to continue for many years to come as further
functionalities are introduced and as the systems become
integrated within the often taken for granted practices of the
hospital.
Multiple translations of the vision
Within our case study sites, we found that there were many
different translations of the overall vision of NHS Care Records
Service systems among various stakeholders. These ranged from
those that focused on managing patients’ data (such as data
capture, storage, and sharing) to changing organisational
arrangements and workflows (such as business process change)
to more policy related aims (such as modernisation, shift to
patient focus). For example, some held a business driven view
that emphasised standardised practice at the expense of
innovation in workflow, clinical practice, interorganisational
arrangements, or management and policy ambitions:
“Ideal is that the NHS will become standardised, so
the way in which we interact with computers and the
way in which we interact with patients will become
standardised” (interview, IT professional, site C).
Such views clashedwith those who saw electronic health records
as being a way to achieve more patient centred healthcare:
“it’s the patients that hold the record and the patient
should control who has access to it . . . Give the patient
the record and give the patient the key to unlock it.
They are partly responsible for the record themselves”
(interview, healthcare professional, site R).
We found little evidence of efforts to align these perspectives
to aid the process of working towards agreed goals. The
persistence of multiple visions thus possibly reflected limited
or ineffective communication channels to maintain or indeed
refine or update the original vision.
The arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in
institutional settings
Various approaches were taken by local organisations to prepare
for implementation, and several internal and external factors
shaped the different implementation strategies pursued. These
included different levels of maturity of NHS Care Records
Service systems, concurrent changes occurring in sites (for
example, working to achieve greater autonomy from the
Department of Health), changes in the National Programme as
a whole (for example, contract renegotiations), and in NHS
policies and targets (for example, financial savings and
restructuring of commissioningmodels), all adding uncertainties
and delays to the process.
“I think people get a bit, is it worth it? Is it worth me
continuing? Should I put the effort in?” (interview,
IT professional, site C).
Most of the hospitals we studied were “early adopters.” This
meant that all concerned (that is, NHS Connecting for Health,
suppliers, local service providers, and hospitals) were
encountering problems for the first time. These often involved
the challenges inherent in putting software into practice and
related problems with connectivity, usability, training, data
quality and migration, and system downtime.
The complex supply chains and convoluted communication
processes between hospitals, local service providers, software
suppliers, and NHS Connecting for Health that we previously
described, persisted over time.38 The tensions relating to
contracts often led to a rigid focus on a limited set of
“deliverables,” thereby hindering any attempts at fostering local
ownership or meaningful engagement with NHS staff. There
was consequently a lack of attention to more productive
deliberations that might have helped to overcome the many
challenges that were (inevitably) encountered. Hospitals, as the
“client” or “problem owner,” were hampered by a lack of
budgetary control, lack of information about contractual
arrangements, and lack of ability to configure the software
(constrained by contractual clauses). Nor could they effectively
engage in direct communication with the software supplier. The
primacy of these commercial relationships often meant that
participants suggested that contracts were focused on the
delivery of the product rather than on its quality, the process of
delivery, achieving meaningful use, and wider consequences of
its implementation:
“I think it’s always very difficult when you involve a
commercial company with a public service, because
a commercial companywill always be driven by profit
and the money that they are making. Maybe as things
get critical the quality of what’s delivered becomes a
secondary issue” (interview, healthcare professional,
site C).
This led at times to a gradual disengagement by hospital staff.
Also contributing to disengagement was the communications
cycle between user and developer that was often extended and
fragmented. The potential for imaginative or pragmatic problem
solving furthermore clashed with the “top down” approach
governed by software contracts and formal processes of
requirement specification.
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Box 1: Continuing and intensified impact of external context on local deployments—key emerging issues
Contractual tensions
• Perceived to inhibit local choice and decision making, with these arrangements becoming more complex and far reaching as time
progressed
• Resulting in an increasingly strained relationship between stakeholders, slowly eroding good will on all parts and inhibiting progress
Media portrayal and impact
• Perceived to have contributed considerably to a negative public perception of the National Programme as a whole by an unremitting
focus on negative aspects such as delays, costs, and problems occurring during implementations
• Some implementations were played out in the press as exemplar sites, with their success assumed to either “make or break” the
National Programme as a whole and associated software systems, local service providers, and developers
Box 2: Three national electronic health record systems implemented as part of National Programme
Cerner Millennium
• Commercial “off the shelf” software supplied by Cerner, developed in the United States and provided by BT
• Offered to secondary healthcare settings in London and the South of England
• Had to be configured to English healthcare settings
• Initially sites had limited customisability but more choice to adjust functionalities was given in 2010 under the “New Delivery Model”
• Planned to be delivered in four different sequential releases that built on each other with progressively richer functionalities
• Hospitals followed a “big bang” approach to implementations
• By December 2010 Cerner Millennium was live in six out of 32 acute hospitals in London and in nine out of 40 acute hospitals in the
South of England
RiO
• Commercial “off the shelf” web based software developed in the United Kingdom by CSE Healthcare (formerly CSE-Servelec)
• Provided by BT to mental health hospitals, community organisations, and primary care settings
• Offered to sites in London and the South of England
• RiO was planned to be deployed in four waves starting with version 4.0 or 5.0 and ending with version 7
• Problems encountered during upgrades from version 4.0 to 5.1 led to temporary suspension of deployments, which resumed by 2010
• Configured to meet the individual needs of mental health settings
• By December 2010, RiO was live in 17/45 community and mental health hospitals in the South, in 8/10 mental health hospitals, and
in 30/31 primary care settings in London
Lorenzo Regional Care
• Web based software solution offered to hospitals located in North, Midlands, and East of England
• Supplied by iSOFT, developed in India and provided by CSC Alliance
• Not “off the shelf,” but a growing product intended to be developed in line with requirements of hospitals
• Implementation of Lorenzo Regional Care was stepwise (paper and computer systems were gradually replaced with electronic systems
in selected parts of hospitals initially)
• Supplied in four different releases with increasing functionality
• Common characteristic of all implementations was the small scale and scope
• By December 2010, limited Lorenzo Regional Care functionality was implemented in one mental health hospital, two community
hospitals, and three acute hospitals
“The milestones in the plan were set as a contractual
milestone so we weren’t allowed to alter those. What
was quite difficult was we had to work backwards
from those milestones . . . milestones that were set
were probably going to be unachievable, but we had
to work within the constraints of that contract”
(interview, IT professional, site R).
“it takes much longer to do anything than you think
it’s going to take and there’s so many people involved,
so many committees involved to get anything done at
the supply side that it takes a long time to get things
sorted and that’s unfortunate” (interview, IT
professional, site H).
Standardisation versus localisation
All sites adopting the software systems faced trade-offs between
standardisation and localisation. Administrative, technical, and
clinical users interviewed were often aware of this tension and
of the need to balance the requirements of individual
organisations and the NHS more generally. Thus, some were
concerned that the more customised the software became the
more distant it would get from its centrally defined purposes:
“If you keep giving people the ability to localise things
you kind of drive away from a centralised
understanding” (interview, healthcare professional,
site C).
Assumptions inscribed into NHSCare Records Service systems
as to how the English NHS operated (or should operate) were
often challenged. The system was often perceived by hospital
staff to reflect developers’ lack of understanding of their clinical
processes, resulting in systems that were often seen as linear
and homogeneous, and unable to fit to the actual complexities
of clinical practice:
“What was delivered was a clumsy system that seems
to have been designed for one clinician who has clinics
booked up in advance that uniquely come in and
everybody who comes shows up or maybe they don’t
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Box 3: Three national electronic health record systems and different ways of working them out
Cerner Millennium
• Hospitals could tailor Cerner Millennium to their respective settings within the constraints of the contract
• Cerner Millennium sites initially required a rewriting of the patient administration system and then made adjustments to the final product
• During configuration Cerner Millennium was tested and any issues that were raised were prioritised by the hospitals before being
reported to the local service provider to be fixed
• The New Delivery Model allowed hospitals to configure the product to their needs. Co-location was perceived as an important factor
for accomplishing joined up configuration, avoiding bottlenecks in the supply chain and dealing with failures directly. This process also
gave sites a sense of control over configuration, though the local service provider would still play an active role by mediating between
hospitals and Cerner
• One hospital implemented a version of Cerner Millennium configured by the University of Pittsburgh Medical Centre with a view to
anglicising the software so that it represented their clinical pathways and reflected their lines of accountability and hierarchy
RiO
• Hospitals could tailor RiO to their respective settings within the constraints of the contract
• Some argued that RiO did initially not support reporting on performance adequately and thus brought in people to help develop this
functionality
• RiO was implemented across all mental health hospitals in London, bringing several benefits
Lorenzo Regional Care
• Lorenzo Regional Care had to be substantially developed and redesigned by sites to meet their needs and support clinical processes
• Sites would get new builds of the system on a regular basis in the testing environment before they went to the live environment. During
this process they collected any issues, which were then prioritised, being kept by each site in a log and managed in collaboration with
the government and local service providers. These issues would be reported to the Computer Sciences Corporation, which would
then report them to iSOFT to be fixed
• To facilitate the process, some project team members travelled to Chennai and worked together with the developers. iSOFT and the
local service provider set up regular web-conference meetings with sites during which the software was demonstrated from Chennai
and sites were able to comment and provide feedback before any change was made to the code
• Lorenzo Regional Care was, since the point of its adoption, under continuous development, which adversely impacted on hospitals’
ability to plan for anticipated changes
• Despite the fact that Lorenzo Regional Care was one system, its design and functionalities were different in the different settings.
While the few healthcare professionals who used Lorenzo Regional Care made it work for them and were happy with the system,
other users continued to experience frustrations
show up. There is nothingmore complicated than that”
(interview, healthcare professional, site M).
The complex supply chains added tortuous bottlenecks in
resolving such issues. In line with this, some participants
reported that the software they were implementing was
“inflexible,” that they “had to push hard for every single change
in the system,” and that “finding solutions seemed to be long
winded and difficult” (interview, healthcare professional, site
R).
Some early benefits for staff
The challenging experiences described above did not necessarily
invalidate the case for electronic health records. Enhanced
availability of data and data management tools were perceived
as benefits by managers and some clinical users when
information was legible, available in “real time,” more easily
searchable and retrievable (such as for management purposes),
and accessible “any time” and “anywhere” by multiple
concurrent users. The teamworking that exemplifies community
mental health provided an example of where sharing of data
brought clear benefits.
“The main thing really is that we can read people’s
writing. That was a big thing before that you couldn’t
actually read what people were writing in the NHS
across the board. Now we can read everybody’s
writing. That is a major thing. And people I think
forget that over time. You quickly forget the bad old
days of not being able to read what somebody has
written” (interview, healthcare professional, site M).
“It’s good for performance management as well, so
you can go back to clinicians and go OK never mind
how many patients you saw, this is your risk level of
your case load, this is the risk level of somebody else’s
caseload, look at the difference? Why do you think
that might be, and you can also look at numbers, you
know, this is the number of letters that you’ve sent to
GPs [general practitioners] how come so and so sends
this many letters and you only do this many letters,
you know, because you’ve got absolutely everything
there” (interview, IT professional, site H).
These positive developments really materialised only after a
system had achieved a critical mass of users and data. Initially,
there was often seen to be a need to “feed the beast” (interview,
healthcare professional, site H), getting little, if anything, in
return.
Electronic transmission of information was also reported as
making some user workflows faster overall, although individual
stages of these workflows could become more time consuming
than the previous system—this was, for example, the case if the
data input screen required additional or different data from those
that were customarily recorded. In such cases, staff often
understood that the extra investment of time on their part served
an important wider organisational function, but in the context
of already heavy clinical or administrative workloads investing
this additional time still often rankled.
More generally, our data, drawn from multiple user and
managerial communities across sites, suggested that the upheaval
associated with implementing these systems had given the
opportunity for organisational learning and reflection. Staff
were often engaged with the problem of getting the best out of
the new system and in exploring its possibilities. As one IT
professional stated:
“There are a lot of experienced people now that
understand what this type of changemeans to the NHS
and how to help them to make that happen that I think
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Box 4: New emerging themes and subthemes: local consequences of implementation of NHS Care Records Service
systems
Translations of the vision
• The NHS Care Records Service as a multifaceted concept embedding various visions
The arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in institutional settings
• Ways in which hospitals prepared themselves for the NHS Care Records Service
Hospitals had different characteristics and varied histories, but reasons for being an “early adopter” were often similar
Management and technical infrastructures varied substantially
Approaches and methodologies for implementation strategies varied across hospitals
Each hospital organised its own training to tailor the service to the local systems and the needs of users
Sufficient resources were necessary for the timely implementation of the NHS Care Records Service
• Concerns related to the arrival of the NHS Care Records Service in institutional settings
Delays in organisational readiness because of differentiation within each hospital
Parallel running of other initiatives and projects
Implementation dissociated from actual practice
Complex supply and management chain
Changing NHS policies
• Implementation as a process
Made to work through the mediation of several people and technologies
Distinction between implementation and adoption was blurred
The software systems were being put into use, used, and adapted and back to being “implemented”—a cyclical process of growth
Standardisation versus localisation
• Different software systems were modified in different ways
• Concerns included: standardisation versus localisation, lack of knowledge about the product, the English NHS, and clinical work
• Complex supply chains
• Involvement of commercial organisations
Some early benefits for staff
• Enhanced availability of data and data management tools
• Multidisciplinary teams sharing a patient’s care on site or across sites, transfers of care especially with referrals/discharges or requests for
investigations/reports
• Learning that had taken place
Learning about managing and implementing large scale IT led organisational change projects
Learning to use IT to support organisational and healthcare goals
Work processes and changes in work practices
• Changes to clinical and administrative work processes for patient care
Various users and reasons to use the systems
Processes of adaptation, compensating, workarounds
Changes to sequencing in recording clinical notes
Redistribution of work and time for patient care
Flexibility and mobility of work
Quality of work life
• Professional identity, peer relations, and engagement with the technology
• Changes to local management processes
• Managing with real time data
Making work visible
Overall developments in the face of continuing political, economic, and policy uncertainty
• Implementation progress has been slow
• Shifting political and economic climate and progressive move from the initial “top down” implementation model to an increase in local involvement
in decision making
• Lack of sustained leadership and lack of certainty for hospitals yet to implement
• Danger that work invested will not be utilised
• Risk of reverting back to patchy implementations of the main patient administration systems with limited clinical functionality and poor
interoperability
you wouldn’t want to lose that” (interview, IT
professional, site D).
Work processes and changes in work practices
We found that the NHS Care Records Service was usually
portrayed by planners and implementers as a set of systems
designed primarily for clinical users, but that the main users of
the software systems, at least in the early phases, were often
allied health professionals and administrative staff. Their
interests and concerns, however, seemed less likely to be
elicited, understood, or acted on as implementations went
forward.
“Well you feel like saying if it’s not working well
let’s go home shall we, cause you just feel why have
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I bothered to come into work, you would come in
before and you would think well I’ve got three clinics
there that day and you’re just thinking well I knew I
could get three of them typed you’re lucky now if you
can get one typed in a day. I said at one of the
meetings well when are you going to start employing
some extra staff if you want the work done instead of
cutting back on us, which is what they’re doing
because now with the system work’s just all piled up
and they’re just giving us a system, we don’t have any
cover, work piled up for two weeks, and the system
is taking two or three times as long” (interview,
administrative staff, site B).
Senior clinicians were often (particularly in the early stages of
the implementation) less likely to be affected directly by the
system on a daily basis than their more junior colleagues (though
this to an extent depended on the system in question and the
specialty). For instance, a consultant psychiatrist explained that
junior doctors would type clinical information into the electronic
health record on their behalf:
“I have a team. I probably use [RiO] less than 10%
of the time, because if I’m seeing patients in a ward
setting, it would be my junior doctor that’s inputting
the information” (interview, healthcare professional,
site M).
Over time, the software systems were, in most cases, made to
work better and more in synchrony with the local practices of
delivery of care. Users, despite the problems they faced, were
with effort able to “reconfigure” the software or reconfigure
their way of working. In this way, their early frustrations were
in some cases reduced. Thus a process of adaptation and
adoption into the complex settings in which the software systems
were implemented occurred. If this adjustment process was not
possible, however, staff were obliged to accommodate the
idiosyncrasies of the technology (for example, by using other
systems, adopting compensating behaviours, or by partial use).
Getting to know the limits of the system, users learnt to prepare
and compensate. In doing so, they “creatively” devised strategies
to overcome usability issues, such as taking screenshots of the
just typed notes when the system “froze” and then printing it to
add it to the paper file to avoid having to re-do time consuming
work. This also, for example, involved leaving identity
authentication cards in computer terminals to avoid lengthy
log-in processes, as illustrated by the following researcher
observation note:
10.45am: Student is now seeing a patient (old lady)
in cubicle 1, chatting “How are you today? How are
you getting on with your cream? Are you diabetic?
Do you have thyroid problems?”; the system is still
running on the laptop and the SmartCard [an identity
authentication card] is in it while [the healthcare
professional] is still out of the room.
The need to “trick the system” to overcome constraints (such
as mandated fields or screens unfit for a specific clinical activity)
and to “get the job done” or absence of the right clinical code
in a drop down menu could result in issues further down the
line—for instance, impacting on data quality or management’s
ability to monitor activity levels.
Systems also led to a redistribution of work, with in some cases,
clinicians doing more of the data entry that would otherwise be
done by “typists” or “data entry” clerks. As a result, some
participants reported that constant use of computers was “not
really what [they] signed up for,” and other interviewees argued
that NHSCare Records Service software was undermining their
professional standing by forcing them to undertake
administrative tasks:
“Especially when it started for the first few months it
was very much, we felt like IT people, we felt like
admin people instead of actual clinicians because we
were spending more time with this system than we
were actually with the patient” (interview, healthcare
professional, site H).
This was exacerbated when data entry on the computer took (or
seemed to take) longer than on paper, which put additional
pressure on users:
“All our doctors and nurses are having to work harder
now, because we are having to see the same number
of patients with less time, because you are spending
more time on a computer now and we have got no
more doctor or nursing resources to do that”
(interview, healthcare professional, site D).
Overall, work practices did not become “paperless” or even
“paper light”: note taking while with the patient was still most
often done on paper—sometimes on the back of scraps of used
paper—with data entry to the computer systems done
retrospectively (though this depended again on the maturity of
the system in question). A major change in work practices
expected by many at the outset, indeed a part of the vision, was
concurrent entry of clinical information on the system at the
time the activity took place (such as when consulting with a
patient). For instance, in one hospital, the intention of
management was for:
“Staff to update the record in real-time, so that the
NHS Care Records Service became accepted as a
normal part of their work” (interview, IT professional,
site D).
In most hospitals, however, clinicians did not enter data in the
system while they were with the patients (either at bedside,
during ward rounds, or during outpatient clinics). This changed
to some extent over time and varied between settings, but the
example of mental health patients presenting in emergency
departments (which had target times within which all patients
needed to be seen) was particularly telling:
“I think there is a big issue for junior doctors out of
hours and the nightshift in accident and emergency
because the psychiatric assessments are quite lengthy
and there is quite a lot of notes that go with it. What
they usually do while they are in with the patient is,
they make the notes as they go along and they are the
record. They’ve raised concerns that they will be in
with the patient and they are then going to have to
come and type those notes up. They are not going to
be able to do it while they are with the patient, because
of issues like risk. These are patients that are really
quite disturbed. You can’t kind of be faffing around
getting them by computers. So it’s going to increase
the time spent and you are then delayed seeing the
next patient, that’s going to impact on the breaches
of accident and emergency which is I think the big
anxiety” (interview, healthcare professional, site M).
The national implementation landscape
Overall, progress with implementing the NHS Care Records
Service has been much slower than anticipated, with little
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implementation of clinical applications. As of December
2010—by which time the implementation should have been
completed10—8/219 hospitals (4%) were live with limited
Lorenzo Regional Care functionality in the NorthMidlands and
Eastern area of England; in the South 17/45 (38%) community
and mental health hospitals were live with RiO and 9/40 acute
hospitals (23%) were live with Cerner Millennium; and in
London 6/32 acute hospitals (19%) were live with Cerner
Millennium software, while RiO was being used by 8/10 (80%)
mental health hospitals and 30/31 primary care settings (97%).
Altogether, of the 377 sites in which implementation should
have taken place, 78 (21%) had begun the process of
implementing a variant of the NHS Care Records Service. It
should, however, be noted that the figures for implementation
of the NHS Care Records Service slightly underestimate the
level of computerisation of the patient record across England
as a few hospitals do have substantial systems outside of the
National Programme.
We found that the changing political and economic
climate—specifically the change in government and the
economic recession—resulted in uncertainty about the future
of the National Programme. There was in particular a substantive
move away from the initial “top-down” implementation model
to an increase in local involvement in decision making,
particularly in London and the Southern areas.12 For example,
as one national media report noted:
“BT’s new agreement with the Department of Health
may provide a better indication of the Programme’s
future. The company, which met the deadline it was
set to implement Cerner Millennium at Kingston
Hospital last year, agreed to cut £112m (11%) from
its £996m local service provider contract to the NHS
in London. It will do so by abandoning the idea of
uniform software: if London hospital trusts [that is,
hospitals] already have fit-for-purpose IT, BT will
connect those systems rather than replace them.”84
These changes were, at the time of writing, ongoing, with the
coalition government still not having published a detailed IT
strategy for the NHS. The initial indications were that the future
of the National Programme was likely to be characterised by
increased local input in decision making and an opening up of
the supplier market, thereby allowing greater supplier choice.18 85
This should be contrasted with the originally planned NHSCare
Records Service, which, as noted above, aimed to deliver an
integrated standardised solution.
Locally, we witnessed several major impacts of these wider
developments. The resulting lack of sustained leadership from
the centre rendered it difficult for the hospitals to develop any
coherent long term strategy. There were serious concerns by
hospitals that had already begun implementing NHS Care
Records Service systems such as Lorenzo Regional Care but
with only limited clinical functionality:
“I cannot see how that’s ever going to succeed, I just
can’t and as you quite rightly say you’ve got bits of
functionality implemented in very small areas. You’ve
got bits of functionality implemented in podiatry or
somewhere else but you’re not seeing the rollout of
that functionality to the rest of an organisation and
how on earth are you going to progress if they’re not
doing that so, you know, you’re going to have, you
know, isolated developments in isolated areas in an
organisation and that’s not what the NHS needs, you
know, it needs things that are optimising things across
organisations” (interview, independent sector).
These concerns extended to questions about the likely “life
span” and degree of continuing support for these nationally
procured systems (as contracts with local service providers are
scheduled to end in 2015) and potential consequences to local
morale if efforts to implement were to be “abandoned” in the
current austerity climate. Most thought that the considerable
work invested in making these systems work and the local
expertise gained in the process should not be allowed to wither
but were nonetheless unclear as to what direction they should
take.
There were no coherent plans for the many hospitals yet to
implement these systems, leaving some organisations to consider
alternative options. Our work indicated that this was especially
apparent in the more autonomous hospitals.
“[name] was pretty plain until quite recently that any
[hospital] that broke away from the National
Programme would be penalised even if, you know,
the guidance says that, you know, [more autonomous
hospitals] don’t have to adopt national solutions so I
think there was a lot of management pressure to keep
[more autonomous hospitals] in the loop” (interview,
independent sector).
The over-riding related concern expressed by several mangers
was that the move away from the original goals of the National
Programme and in particular the NHS Care Records
Service—without any parallel focus on ensuring interoperability
and shared learning—would risk reverting the NHS back to the
same situation that led to the creation of the National
Programme—namely, patchy implementations of the main
patient administration systems with limited clinical functionality
and poor interoperability.
“Well strangely enough of course, you know, going
back 20-30 years OK the technology was very
different but, you know, there were custom-built NHS
solutions so [name of hospital] went through a
custom-built approach but what was found was I think
it might have worked at [name of hospital] but they
could never really get it to work anywhere else. . . So
I think decisions were taken in setting up the National
Programmewhich didn’t take enough account of what
had happened in the past, there was a view, you know,
which was well you guys who’ve been working in
this space up till now have failed, you haven’t
delivered what was needed so here we are with a fresh
new broom and Richard Granger was very much on
record as saying, you know, we’re going to clear,
we’re going to start afresh and the National
Programme is about rip and replace and, you know,
in hindsight that was probably the wrong approach”
(interview, independent sector).
Discussion
Main findings
Implementation of NHS Care Records Service systems has
proceeded much more slowly than expected and with as yet
limited benefits for NHS staff or patients. Delays seemed to be
caused by the complex and constantly shifting national set-up
characterised by complex politically shaped contractual
relationships that largely excluded NHS healthcare providers.
Many stakeholders had a lack of appreciation of the social and
organisational consequences of implementing technology and
unrealistic expectations about the capabilities of the software
systems; the time needed to build, configure, and customise the
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software; the work needed to ensure that these systems were
supporting rather than hindering provision of care; and the
training and support needs of end users (and particularly
non-clinical staff). The local consequences for organisations
implementing different functionalities were considerable in
terms of time and efforts it took to “work out” the new
technology and cost implications. Across hospitals, however,
we found that some benefits emerged over time, mainly relating
to organisational learning and improved local data sharing.
Strengths and limitations of this work
The scale, volume of data obtained, and real time nature of this
evaluation of the implementation of electronic health records
in English secondary healthcare settings are strengths of our
work.1 We also used a methodologically innovative design,86
captured contemporaneous multifaceted real time longitudinal
data, and had theoretical grounding.19 87 As a result we obtained
a rich and nuanced appreciation of the implementation and
adoption of the NHS Care Records Service locally, the depth
of inquiry offering transferability beyond the immediate context
of this evaluation as we sampled from a range of hospitals,
software systems, and stakeholders.19 88 This depth of inquiry
and the richness of the ensuing dataset enabled us to consider
a range of explanatory factors. For example, we considered both
generational and skills-related factors to explain the problems
encountered by healthcare professionals, and, while there was
some evidence of these being important in a few instances, they
did not emerge as major in explaining the lack of progress with
implementation and adoption to date. This diversity of context
and data is, we believe, a strength, particularly in the study of
electronic health records, where much reported research relates
to a single site, often a well resourced centre of excellence.48
This work also has several limitations. In working with the
“early adopters” we observed problems that were being dealt
with for the first time by all stakeholders; these might eventually
be resolved through negotiation, and subsequent implementers
could learn from these early experiences. Studying “early
adopters” could be viewed as a worst case scenario. That said,
these sites were selected (sometimes after competition) on the
basis of their previous track record of implementing IT and the
leadership capacity, or both, within the organisation, and they
often received considerable financial and technical support of
an order that is unlikely to be offered to later adopters. In some
respects these can therefore be seen as best case scenarios.
Judging the balance between these two positions comes down
in part to the notion of the perfectibility of the technical
elements. If “early adopters” “iron out the wrinkles” and refined
technology is inherently more acceptable and usable, then things
should get better. But on balance we are not convinced by this
argument as the more fundamental and challenging issue is
organisational change, not technical refinement. The key point
is that it is important to extrapolate with caution from our work
on “early adopters” to later adopting sites. Our focus was on
investigating issues and emergent changes in early
implementation processes as opposed to systematically
identifying benefits (though we did search extensively for these
during our work) such as those outlined in appendix 1 on
bmj.com. Benefits of implementing a national IT based health
records system might not be seen for several years as there is a
natural learning curve in any organisational change initiative,
highlighting the need for longer term longitudinal mixed
methods work.
Another important issue has been gatekeeper influence at all
levels, possibly because of conflicting priorities, but possibly
also the, at times politically charged, nature of the
implementation of NHS Care Records Service, which has been
the subject of major sustained parliamentary, political, and
media scrutiny, both in the UK and internationally.10 89-97 The
latest wave of this scrutiny has been triggered by a National
Audit Office report, which concluded that “given its past history,
the major issues still confronting the care records systems, and
with such significant funds still at stake, there is a compelling
case for the recently announced Whitehall-wide review to
re-evaluate the business case for the Programme to determine
what should happen now to safeguard against further loss of
public value.”16 17 This political environment resulted in
restricted access to some stakeholders, including patients,
developers, governmental stakeholders, and healthcare
professionals. It also meant that some stakeholders initially
seemed to hesitate in providing us with information, particularly
in relation to what they considered to be sensitive (and
sometimes confidential). Nevertheless, the longitudinal nature
of the evaluation helped in building trust and facilitating more
open discussion, particularly with members of NHSConnecting
for Health. Similarly, information relating to the actual “go live”
dates of hospitals was difficult to obtain, impacting on our
sampling strategy and ability to plan.
Finally, our formative work might have had an impact on the
findings from our summative research, and this could therefore
be seen by some as a limitation. We, however, view this as a
strength as it provided an opportunity to share with hospitals
any early lessons learnt.98
Policy implications for the NHS
Policymakers have already started to shift the focus to more
local efforts to procure and implement electronic health records,
these being reinforced by the changes in outlook of the coalition
government, the planned changes to the NHS in England (such
as a drive to increasing the autonomy of hospitals from the
control of central government), and the current economic
climate.12 18 85 In the light of this evolving policy landscape, and
drawing on our research and broader international experiences,
we have summarised our main recommendations in box 5. A
particularly urgent short term measure is to make the software
work well in the NHS organisations that have already started
implementation.
While welcomed by many NHS hospitals, the move to a more
locally driven approachmight also mean somemajor trade offs.
These include the risk of potentially conflicting local priorities
resulting in insufficient drive and funding for such
developments, problems with systems interoperability, and
failure to share lessons learnt with consequent entrenchment of
local work practices rather than the original vision to
“transform” healthcare nationally. Furthermore, not all hospitals
will have the expertise to implement such transformative IT
initiatives, which in turn could result in unacceptable risks to
the safety and quality of care. There is also the danger of double
counting potential efficiency gains as those included in the
business case for IT implementations overlap with those
included in other local cost reduction initiatives.
Implications for the international community
The English experience offers several potentially transferable
lessons for ongoing international efforts to implement electronic
health records.99-104 First and foremost, there remain important
drivers for the implementation of integrated electronic health
records, including the potential for increased accessibility, which
is important considering themore fragmented nature of provision
of care and the major advantages associated with digitised data
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Box 5: Summary of emerging key policy recommendations
Overall strategy
• Build on a coherent vision of shared electronic health records to improve the provision of joined up patient centred care
• Devise a strategy that is characterised by flexibility and the ability to respond to evolving needs, while ensuring that there is a clear
local rationale aligned with national purposes
• Move away from technology driven models of implementation and refocus attention on adoption as ongoing “working out” between
staff and technology; think of technology as an enabler of improved care processes rather than an end in itself
Architecture
• Ensure that software is assessed to be fit for purpose by users in the implementing organisations
Process
• Make software work well in the NHS organisations that have already started implementation
• Ensure that procurement decisions are not based on unrealistic assumptions of achieving cost savings or even short term returns on
investment, but rather on introducing clinical functionality early so that these systems are used
• Balance central incentives to implement with large scale interoperability and local input in decision making
• Ensure sustained efforts and appropriate funding characterised by a coherent strategy with realistic timelines to allow local organisations
time to “work out” the consequences of the change
• Consider the merits of participating in the development of open source systems as opposed to the purchase of commercially developed
systems
• Retain hard won knowledge at both local and national levels and make appropriate use of these skills and expertise both in and across
sites
• Facilitate the sharing of experience and learning both nationally and internationally
in relation to facilitating quality improvement initiatives and
research.
As we have shown, the procurement of national systems in
England had a range of unanticipated consequences. Large scale
procurement was undertaken to save costs, but this meant that
implementation timelines were rushed, being driven according
to political timeframes in line with procurement arrangements.
Hospitals have coped differently with these pressures, often
heavily influenced by the particular type of software
implemented. Despite the important learningwithin and between
organisations that had taken place across the sites we studied,
these national pressures have, in some cases, resulted in software
being deployed prematurely with adverse consequences for local
organisations, users, and patients’ care.We therefore recommend
that procurement decisions should not be based on unrealistic
assumptions of achieving cost savings or even short term returns
on investment, but rather on introducing clinical and associated
decision support functionality early so that these systems are
used and deliver demonstrable clinical benefits.103 105 Adequate
national investments also need to be made to support
interoperability, which is fundamental to enabling reuse of
data.103Recent announcements in the English strategy, however,
indicate that only 2% of the total IT modernisation budget has
been allocated to support interoperability.16
Strategically, it is essential that any health informatics policy
is integrated with concurrent policy initiatives and reflects the
dynamic environment in which it is taking place. In England,
this has to some extent been achieved (such as by gradual
movement towards a more localised approach), while on the
other hand it was (and still is) hard to adapt nationally set
arrangements to evolving needs (such as contracts with local
service providers). The consequences of these are often still
hard felt on the ground. Admittedly, it is difficult to achieve
this balance as healthcare organisations are continually changing.
For example, the increasing competition among healthcare
organisations might not align with delivering the benefits of
shared learning, nor with prioritising efforts to ensure large-scale
interoperability.18 The recent National Audit Office report
highlights current uncertainties regarding future responsibilities
within the National Programme.16 This is of particular concern
as it is unlikely that organisations that are being encouraged to
compete with each other will focus attention on interoperability
without specific incentives of the kind that are being promoted
in, for example, the US and Canada.106
Given the challenges inherent in contracting on a national scale,
there is a need to consider the merits of participating in the
development of open source systems as opposed to the purchase
of commercially developed systems.107 Indeed, the resources
devoted to the development of Lorenzo Regional Care already
represent a considerable transfer of intellectual property from
the NHS.
Implications for future research
How national strategy evolves is one issue, but not the only one.
It clearly remains important to investigate the longer term
consequences of substantial hospital-wide health records
systems, taking into account evolving skill levels of users and
evolving organisational capacity.103 There is also a need to assess
whether once used, NHSCare Records Service software systems
improve the quality and safety of care, the more effective
management of resources, the way in which care practices are
organised and delivered, and professional roles. Finally, we
identify a pressing need to develop appropriate models to inform
how best to implement national systems and, in particular, to
assess whether paying appropriate attention to the sociotechnical
dimensions of implementation is beneficial at promoting
successful adoption.
Conclusions
The “top down” nature of the national programme has, despite
ensuring necessary high level leadership and support,12
contributed to a lack of organisational and user involvement in
decision making. Organisations and users implementing and
adopting the NHS Care Records Service have coped with these
challenges in different ways, their responses being influenced
by the software in question and local arrangements. Despite
some early benefits, particularly in relation to infrastructure and
internal capacity development, our results show that software
systems have as yet had difficulty fulfilling organisational and
user needs.
The strategic move towards a more locally autonomous model
now needs to be balanced with national requirements in terms
of systems interoperability, shared learning, and implementation
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approaches. Early international experiences suggest that use of
such a combination of local and centralised approaches offers
the best chances of successful implementation and adoption.108
England has attempted to pursue a centralised “top down”
approach, and there is now a need for international efforts to
learn from and build on these early experiences. Although our
work has clearly shown that many users, managers, service
providers, and implementers have been sorely bruised by the
first steps in the journey to implement a truly comprehensive
national electronic health record system, history
might—particularly if the right calls are now made at this
important juncture—be more forgiving.
We are grateful to the participating hospitals for supporting this work
and to all interviewees who kindly gave their time. Throughout the
process of undertaking this work we have had helpful support from
colleagues at the NHS Connecting for Health Evaluation Programme
led by Richard Lilford and supported by Lee Priest, Nathalie Maillard,
and Jo Foster. Lee Priest also represented the funders on our
independent project steering committee, which was chaired by David
Bates. Other members of this committee includedMartin Buxton, Antony
Chuter, Ian Cowles, and KathyMason.We also acknowledge the support
of the National Institute for Health Research, through the Comprehensive
Clinical Research Network.
Contributors: AS conceived this study and together with KC, BF, RP,
AA, AJ, TC, EK, JP, and NB secured the funding for this work. They
together with CQ and JW were the grant holders for this project. AS
was overall principal investigator, with AA, TC, and NB leading research
from their respective centres. AR, AT, DP, SC, VL, MF, ZM, YJ, KM,
KV, and KC were the researchers working on this evaluation. AS, KC,
TC, NB, VL, DP, and AT led the writing of this manuscript with coauthors
commenting on drafts of the paper. AS is guarantor.
Funding: This report is independent research commissioned by the NHS
Connecting for Health Evaluation Programme. The views expressed in
this publication are those of the authors and not necessarily those of
the NHS, the NHS Connecting for Health Evaluation Programme, or
the Department of Health.
Competing interests: All authors have completed the ICMJE uniform
disclosure form at www.icmje.org/coi_disclosure.pdf (available on
request from the corresponding author) and declare: all authors have
support in the form of a grant from the NHS Connecting for Health
Evaluation Programme for the submitted work; no financial relationships
with any organisations that might have an interest in the submitted work
in the previous three years; no other relationships or activities that could
appear to have influenced the submitted work.
Ethical approval: This study was reviewed by an NHS ethics committee
and classified as a service evaluation (ref 08/H0703/112).
Data sharing: The technical appendix and the full dataset are available
from the corresponding author. Participants gave informed consent for
data sharing.
1 Black A, Car J, Pagliari C, Anandan C, Cresswell K. The impact of eHealth on the quality
and safety of health care: a systematic overview. PLoS Med 2011;8:e1000387.
2 Department of Health. Information for health: an information strategy for the modern NHS.
DH, 1998. www.dh.gov.uk/en/PublicationsAndStatistics/LettersAndCirculars/
HealthServiceCirculars/DH_4005016.
3 Department of Health. The NHS plan: a plan for investment, a plan for reform. DH, 2000.
4 Department of Health. Building the information core: implementing the NHS plan. DH,
2001.
5 Department of Health. Delivering the NHS plan: next steps on investment, next steps on
reform. DH, 2002.
6 Department of Health. Delivering 21st century IT support for the NHS: national strategic
programme. DH, 2002.
7 Brennan S. The biggest computer programme in the world ever! How’s it going? J
Information Technol 2007;22:201-11.
8 Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, Byrne E, Russell J, Hinder S, et al. The devil’s in the
detail: final report of the independent evaluation of the summary care record and health
space programmes. University College London, 2010
9 Hendy J, Fulop N, Reeves BC, Hutchings A, Collin S. Implementing the NHS information
technology programme: qualitative study of progress in acute trusts. BMJ 2007;334:1360.
10 House of Commons Public Accounts Committee. The national programme for IT in the
NHS: progress since 2006. Stationery Office, 2009.
11 Warner N. A suitable case for treatment. Grosvenor House Publishing, 2011.
12 Robertson A, Cresswell K, Takian A, Petrakaki D, Crowe S, Cornford T. Implementation
and adoption of nationwide electronic health records in secondary care in England:
qualitative analysis of interim results from a prospective national evaluation. BMJ
2010;341:c4564.
13 Cresswell K, Ali M, Avery A, Barber N, Cornford T, Crowe S, et al. The long and winding
road. An independent evaluation of the implementation and adoption of the National
Health Service Care Records Service (NHS CRS) in secondary care in England. www.
haps.bham.ac.uk/publichealth/cfhep/005.shtml.
14 Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, Byrne E, Mohammad Y, Russell J. Introduction of
shared electronic records: multi-site case study using diffusion of innovation theory. BMJ
2008;337:a1786.
15 Greenhalgh T, Stramer K, Bratan T, Byrne E, Russell J, Potts HWW. Adoption and
non-adoption of a shared electronic summary record in England: a mixed-method case
study. BMJ 2010;340:c3111.
16 National Audit Office. The national programme for IT in the NHS: an update on the delivery
of detailed care records systems. www.nao.org.uk/publications/1012/npfit.aspx.
17 Public Accounts Committee. The national programme for IT in the NHS: an update on
the delivery of detailed care records systems. 2011. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
cm201012/cmselect/cmpubacc/1070/1070.pdf.
18 Department of Health. Equity and excellence: liberating the NHS. Stationery Office, 2010.
19 Cornford T, Doukidis GI, Forster D. Experience with a structure, process and outcome
framework for evaluating an information system. Omega 1994;22:491-504.
20 George A, Bennett A. Case studies and theory development in the social sciences. MIT
Press Cambridge, 2005.
21 Miles M, Huberman A. Qualitative data analysis. Sage, 1984.
22 Stake RE. The art of case study research. Sage, 1995.
23 Yin R. Case study research, design and methods. Sage, 2009.
24 Patton MQ. Qualitative research and evaluation methods. Sage, 2002.
25 Flyvbjerg B. Fivemisunderstandings about case study research.Qual Inqu 2006;12:219-45.
26 Mays N, Pope C. Quality in qualitative health research. In Mays N, Pope C, eds. Qualitative
research in health care. BMJ Publishing, 1999.
27 Silverman D. Doing qualitative research. A practical handbook. Sage, 2000.
28 Peters T, Waterman R. In search of excellence: lessons from America’s best run
companies. Harper and Row, 1982.
29 Cresswell KM, Sheikh A. The NHS care record service (NHS CRS): recommendations
from the literature on successful implementation and adoption. Inform Prim Care
2009;17:153-60.
30 Audit Commission. Setting the record straight—a review of progress in health records
services. Stationery Office, 1999.
31 Public Accounts Committee. Public accounts—minutes of evidence. www.publications.
parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmpubacc/390/7030701.htm.
32 Reeves BC, Fulop N, Hendy J, Hutchings A, Collin S, Priedan E, et al. Evaluation of IT
modernisation in the NHS: evaluation of the implementation of the NHS care record service
(NCRS). SDO/44/2003. 2008. www.sdo.nihr.ac.uk/files/project/44-final-report.pdf.
33 HMTreasury. Spending review 2010. http://cdn.hm-treasury.gov.uk/sr2010_completereport.
pdf.
34 Becker HS. Sociological work. Allen Lane, 1971.
35 Sheikh A, McLean S, Cresswell K, Pagliari C, Pappas Y, Car J, et al. The impact of eHealth
on the quality and safety of healthcare: an updated systematic overview & synthesis of
the literature, May 2011. www.haps.bham.ac.uk/publichealth/cfhep/001_Extension.shtml.
36 Aarts J, Doorewaard H, BergM. Understanding implementation: the case of a computerized
physician order entry system in a large Dutch university medical center. J AmMed Inform
Assoc 2004;11:207-16.
37 Adler KG. How to successfully navigate your EHR implementation. Fam Pract Manag
2007;14:33-9.
38 Ammenwerth E, Iller C, Mahler C. IT-adoption and the interaction of task, technology and
individuals: a fit framework and a case study. BMC Med Inform Decis Mak 2006;6:13.
39 Ash J, Berg M. Report of conference Track 4: socio-technical issues of HIS. Int J Med
Inform 2003;69:305-6.
40 Austin CJ, Hornberger KD, Shmerling JE. Managing information resources: a study of
ten healthcare organizations. J Healthc Manag 2000;45:229-38.
41 Bali RK, Wickramasinghe N. Achieving successful EPR implementation with the
penta-stage model. Int J Healthc Technol Manag 2008;9:97-105.
42 Bates DW, Ebell M, Gotlieb E, Zapp J, Mullins HC. A proposal for electronic medical
records in US primary care. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2003;10:1-10.
43 Bates DW, Kuperman GJ, Wang S, Gandhi T, Kittler A, Volk L, et al. Ten commandments
for effective clinical decision support: making the practice of evidence-based medicine a
reality. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2011;10:523-30.
44 Beuscart-Zephir MC, Anceaux F, Crinquette V, Renard JM. Integrating users’ activity
modeling in the design and assessment of hospital electronic patient records: the example
of anesthesia. Int J Med Inform 2001;64:157-71.
45 Boonstra A, Broekhuis M. Barriers to the acceptance of electronic medical records by
physicians from systematic review to taxonomy and interventions. BMC Health Serv Res
2010;10:231.
46 Bossen C. Test the artefact—develop the organization. The implementation of an electronic
medication plan. Int J Med Inform 2007;76:13-21.
47 Callen JL, Braithwaite J, Westbrook JI. Contextual implementation model: a framework
for assisting clinical information system implementations. J Am Med Inform Assoc
2008;15:255-62.
48 Chaudhry B, Wang J, Wu S, Maglione M, Mojica W, Roth E, et al. Systematic review:
impact of health information technology on quality, efficiency, and costs of medical care.
Ann Intern Med 2006;144:742-52.
49 Clemmer TP. Computers in the ICU: where we started and where we are now. J Crit Care
2004;19:201-7.
50 Crosson JC, Stroebel C, Scott JG, Stello B, Crabtree BF. Implementing an electronic
medical record in a family medicine practice: communication, decision making, and conflict.
Ann Fam Med 2005;3:307-11.
51 Dagroso D, Williams PD, Chesney JD, Lee MM, Theoharis E, Enberg RN. Implementation
of an obstetrics EMR module: overcoming user dissatisfaction. J Healthc Inf Manag
2007;21:87-94.
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2011;343:d6054 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6054 Page 12 of 14
RESEARCH
What is already known on this topic
Many countries are now actively pursuing the implementation of electronic health records on a national scale
In 2002, England embarked on implementing electronic health record systems with clinically rich functionality spanning both primary
and secondary care settings
Major challenges associated with the government led “top down” implementation strategy have been identified
What this study adds
All 377 hospitals in England should have completed the implementation of electronic health record systems by December 2010; only
one in five, however, had begun implementation
There is a need to move away from technology centred models of “implementation” and focus more attention on the process of “adoption,”
which needs to be seen as an ongoing “working out” between staff and technology
Important learning within and between organisations occurred in “early adopter” sites, which needs to be drawn on to support the ongoing
implementation efforts
52 Davidson E, Chiasson M. Contextual influences on technology use mediation: a
comparative analysis of electronic medical records systems. Eur J Inform Syst
2005;14:6-18.
53 De Mul M, Berg M, Hazelzet JA. Clinical information systems: CareSuite from Picis. J Crit
Care 2004;19:208-14.
54 Duggan C. Implementation evaluation. HIM professionals share their experiences bringing
health IT online. J AHIMA 2006;77:52-5.
55 Fenton SH, Giannangelo K, Stanfill M. Essential people skills for EHR implementation
success. J AHIMA 2006;77:60.
56 Ferneley E, Sobreperez P. Resist, comply or workaround? An examination of different
facets of user engagement with information systems. Eur J Inf Syst 2006;15:345-56.
57 Giuse DA, Kuhn KA. Health information systems challenges: the Heidelberg conference
and the future. Int J Med Inform 2003;69:105-14.
58 Goroll AH, Simon SR, Tripathi M, Ascenzo C, Bates DW. Community-wide implementation
of health information technology: the Massachusetts eHealth collaborative experience. J
Am Med Inform Assoc 2009;16:132-9.
59 Granlien MF, Hertzum M, Gudmundsen J. The gap between actual and mandated use
of an electronic medication record three years after deployment. Stud Health Technol
Inform 2008;136:419-24.
60 Halamka J, Aranow M, Ascenzo C, Bates DW, Berry K, Debor G, et al. E-Prescribing
collaboration in Massachusetts: early experiences from regional prescribing projects. J
Am Med Inform Assoc 2006;13:239-44.
61 Hendy J, Reeves BC, Fulop N, Hutchings A, Masseria C. Challenges to implementing
the national programme for information technology (NPfIT): a qualitative study. BMJ
2005;331:331-6.
62 James D, Hess S, Kretzing JE Jr, Stabile ME. Showing “what right looks like”—how to
improve performance through a paradigm shift around implementation thinking. J Healthc
Inf Manag 2007;21:54-61.
63 Jones M. Learning the lessons of history? Electronic records in the United Kingdom acute
hospitals, 1988-2002. Health Inform J 2004;10:253-63.
64 Karsten H, Laine A. User interpretations of future information system use: a snapshot
with technological frames. Int J Med Inform 2007;76:S136-S140.
65 Keddie Z, Jones R. Information communications technology in general practice:
cross-sectional survey in London. Inform Prim Care 2005;13:113-23.
66 Keshavjee K, Bosomworth J, Copen J, Lai J, Kucukyazici B, Lilani R, et al. Best practices
in EMR implementation: a systematic review. AMIA Annu Symp Proc 2006;982.
67 Lium JT, Tjora A, Faxvaag A. No paper, but the same routines: a qualitative exploration
of experiences in two Norwegian hospitals deprived of the paper based medical record.
BMC Med Inform Decis Mak 2008;8:2.
68 Lorenzi NM, Smith JB, Conner SR, Campion TR. The Success Factor Profile for clinical
computer innovation. Stud Health Technol Inform 2004;107:1077-80.
69 Lu Y-C, Xiao Y, Sears A, Jacko JA. A review and a framework of handheld computer
adoption in healthcare. Int J Med Inform 2005;74:409-22.
70 Ludwick DA, Doucette J. Adopting electronic medical records in primary care: lessons
learned from health information systems implementation experience in seven countries.
Int J Med Inform 2009;78:22-31.
71 Mehta NB, Partin MH. Electronic health records: a primer for practicing physicians. Cleve
Clin J Med 2007;74:826-30.
72 Miranda D, Fields W, Lund K. Lessons learned during 15 years of clinical information
system experience. Comput Nurs 2001;19:147-51.
73 Moen A. A nursing perspective to design and implementation of electronic patient record
systems. J Biomed Inform 2003;36:375-8.
74 Nikula RE. Why implementing EPR’s does not bring about organizational changes—a
qualitative approach. Stud Health Technol Inform 2001;84:666-9.
75 Ovretveit J, Scott T, Rundall TG, Shortell SM, Brommels M. Improving quality through
effective implementation of information technology in healthcare. Int J Qual Health Care
2007;19:259-66.
76 Pagliari C. Implementing the national programme for IT: what can we learn from the
Scottish experience? Inform Prim Care 2005;13:105-11.
77 Pare G. Implementing clinical information systems: a multiple-case study within a US
hospital. Health Serv Manage Res 2002;15:71-92.
78 Pare G, Sicotte C, Jaana M, Girouard D. Prioritizing the risk factors influencing the success
of clinical information system projects. A Delphi study in Canada. Methods Inf Med
2008;47:251-9.
79 Pendergast DK, Buchda VL. Charting the course. A quality journey. Nurs Adm Q
2003;27:330-5.
80 Puffer MJ, Ferguson JA, Wright BC, Osborn J, Anshus AL, Cahill BP, et al. Partnering
with clinical providers to enhance the efficiency of an EMR. J Healthc Inf Manag
2007;21:24-32.
81 Quinzio L, Junger A, Gottwald B, Benson M, Hartmann B, Jost A, et al. User acceptance
of an anaesthesia information management system. Eur J Anaesthesiol 2003;20:967-72.
82 Räisänen C, Linde A. Technologizing discourse to standardize projects in multi-project
organizations: hegemony by consensus? Organization 2004;11:101-21.
83 Rose J, Jones M, Truex D. Socio-theoretic accounts of IS: the problem of agency. Scand
J Inform Syst 2005;17:133-52.
84 Guardian. NPfIT goes to the country. 2010. www.smarthealthcare.com/england-patient-
records.
85 Cabinet Office. Government ICT strategy. 2011. www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/content/
government-ict-strategy.
86 Liu J, Wyatt JC. The case for randomized controlled trials to assess the impact of clinical
information systems. J Am Med Inform Assoc 2011;18:173-80.
87 Murray SA, Sheikh A. Serial interviews for patients with progressive disease. Lancet
2006;368:901-2.
88 Greenhalgh T, Robert G, Macfarlane F, Bate P, Kyriakidou O. Diffusion of innovations in
service organizations: systematic review and recommendations.Milbank Q 2004;82:581.
89 2020 Health. Fixing the NHS IT. 2010. www.hinz.org.nz/uploads/file/Seminar_Gameplan_
May2010/Fixing_NHS_IT_-_A_Plan_of_Action_for_a_New_Government_-_March_2010_
-_Full_version_-_EMBARGOED_UNTIL_noon_220310-1.pdf.
90 Anderson,R. Database state—a report commissioned by the Joseph Rowentree Reform
Trust. 2009. www.jrrt.org.uk/uploads/Database%20State.pdf.
91 BMA evidence to the House of Commons home affairs select committee inquiry into “a
surveillance society.” BMA, 2008.
92 British Computer Society. The way forward for NHS Health Informatics. Where should
NHS Connecting for Health (NHS CFH) go from here? British Computer Society, 2006.
93 Department of Health. Health informatics review report—Darzi review. DH, 2008.
94 eHealth Insider. An independent sector perspective on healthcare IT. eHealth Insider,
2008.
95 Hayes G. Independent review of NHS and social care IT. 2009. www.egov.vic.gov.au/
focus-on-countries/europe/countries-europe/united-kingdom/trends-and-issues-united-
kingdom/e-health-united-kingdom/independent-review-of-nhs-and-social-care-it-in-pdf-
format-1407kb-.html.
96 Royal College of General Practitioners. Informing shared clinical care. Final (reference)
report of the Shared Record Professional Guidance project. RCGP, 2009.
97 King’s Fund. Technology in the NHS—transforming the patient’s experience of care.
King’s Fund, 2008.
98 Lilford RJ, Foster J, Pringle M. Evaluating eHealth: how to make evaluation more
methodologically robust. PLoS Med 2009;6:e1000186.
99 Australian Government. A national health and hospitals network for Australia’s future.
Delivering better health and better hospitals. 2010. www.health.gov.au/internet/yourhealth/
publishing.nsf/Content/report-redbook/$File/HRT_report3.pdf.
100 Certification Commission for Health Information Technology. 2011. www.cchit.org/.
101 Blumenthal D, Tavenner M. The meaningful use regulation for electronic health records.
N Engl J Med 2010;363:501-4.
102 Coiera E. Building a National Health IT System from the middle out. J Am Med Inform
Assoc 2009;16:271-3.
103 European Commission. Interoperable eHealth is worth it. Securing benefits from electronic
health records and ePrescribing. 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/
health/docs/publications/201002ehrimpact_study-final.pdf.
104 Scott JT, Rundall TG, Vogt TM, Hsu J. Kaiser Permanente’s experience of implementing
an electronic medical record: a qualitative study. BMJ 2005;331:1313-6.
105 Coiera EW. Lessons from the NHS National Programme for IT.Med J Aust 2007;186:3-4.
106 Morrison Z, Robertson A, Cresswell K, Crowe S, Sheikh A. Understanding contrasting
approaches to nationwide implementations of electronic health record systems: England,
the USA and Australia. J Healthc Engin 2011;2:25-42.
107 Jha AK, DesRoches CM, Campbell EG, Donelan K, Rao SR, Ferris TG, et al. Use of
electronic health records in US hospitals. N Engl J Med 2009;360:1628-38.
108 DesRoches CM, Rosenbaum SJ. Meaningful use of health information technology in US
hospitals. N Engl J Med 2010;362:1153-5.
Accepted: 5 August 2011
Cite this as: BMJ 2011;343:d6054
This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution Non-commercial License, which permits use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non commercial and
is otherwise in compliance with the license. See: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc/2.0/ and http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.0/legalcode.
No commercial reuse: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2011;343:d6054 doi: 10.1136/bmj.d6054 Page 13 of 14
RESEARCH
Table
Table 1| Summary of recruited hospitals in study of progress of implementation of nationwide electronic health records in secondary care
in England
Annual turnoverNo of bedsLocationFoundation status*Teaching status
Type of
hospital
NHS Care Records Service
applicationSite
£800-1000m1000-1499UrbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
TeachingAcuteCerner MillenniumA
£200-399m1000-1499RuralFoundation (more
autonomous)
Non-teachingAcuteLorenzo Regional Care
(Release 1 and 1.9)
B
£200-399m1000-1499Mixed urbanFoundation (more
autonomous)
TeachingAcuteLorenzo Regional Care
(Release 1)
C
£200-399m500-999UrbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
Non-teachingAcuteCerner MillenniumD
£400-599m500-999UrbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
TeachingAcuteCerner MillenniumE
£200-399m500-999UrbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
TeachingMental healthRiO (4/5)G
<£200mN/AUrbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
Non-teachingCommunityLorenzo Regional Care
(Release 1)
H
<£200mMostly outpatients
but <500 inpatient
beds
UrbanFoundation (more
autonomous)
TeachingMental healthRiO (5.1)M
£400-599m1000-1499Mixed urbanFoundation (more
autonomous)
TeachingAcuteOriginally planned to
implement Cerner Millennium
P
<£200mMostly outpatients
but <500 inpatient
beds
RuralFoundation (more
autonomous)
Non-teachingMental healthLorenzo Regional Care
(Release 1)
Q
No information
available, hospital
recently merged
500-999Mixed urbanNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
Non-teachingAcuteImplemented Cerner
Millennnium R.0 before going
back to their patient
administration system
R
<£200m<500RuralNon-foundation (less
autonomous)
Non-teachingAcuteLorenzo Regional Care
(Release 1)
X
*Foundation status indicates level of autonomy of NHS organisation (www.monitor-nhsft.gov.uk/sites/default/files/publications/Guide_for_applicants_Nov2008.
pdf).
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